Jean Jacques Rousseau’s theory of the general will, steeped in the idea of collective freedom as well as the submission of private interests for the well-being of the common good, does not bode well with the First Amendment’s protection of student speech. It showcases deep tensions as to how public schools operate under democratic authority. Because the general will centers on an aim toward utopian unity rarely found in reality, applying it to an educational setting often legitimizes authoritarian restrictions on student speech, especially when the administration claims to act in the welfare or order of the student body. Major Supreme Court precedents such as Tinker v. Des Moines, Bethel School District v. Fraser, and Morse v. Frederick illustrate just how easily institutional interests can be framed as serving the “common good,” and thus allowing schools to suppress dissenting or uncomfortable speech from their students. The resulting contrast between the idealized collective will brought by Rousseau, and the lived reality of students’ right to free speech is frequently negative in character. Exposing the slippery slope that can appear when appeals to democratic unity occur, through the suppression of minority voices, and exposing the inherent limits of democratic authority in environments that act as laboratories for democracy.
